On the internet there is an explanatory write-up
of “The Subject and Power” (1982) that is a dense and formidable four-page read in its own right. Accordingly I won't slave away at unfolding the text word-for-word. I think these blog posts have the possibility of clarifying and summarizing a bit, perhaps focusing too on something the 'poster' found important, but at heart I see them keeping the discussion of what these readings mean, to us, this class, and the world around us, bouncing along. Jake, Josie and others felt that the blog shouldn't be too formal – the idea being that we should not feel daunted by the prospect of participating. So please feel free to take the conversation where ever you want it to go, ask whatever questions want to be asked, and not feel constrained by whatever interests the poster [me in this case (although I'd love some answers to the questions I have!)] ...
Focault says that power relations are a “set of actions upon other actions.” [341] This argument comes late in the essay but seems to be the key-note of his piece. Before exploring what he means by this, I've provided a brief-brush-by of what seems like the important points leading to this claim.
Summary of first bit:
Foucault argues that exploring the 'antagonisms' of power relations (for instance the labeling of sane versus insane) will bring power relations best to light [328-329]. He chooses to focus on power relationships that are “transversal” in that they don't “attack... such-or-such institution of power” etc. but instead oppose “a technique, a form of power.”[331] This power is the power to 'subjugate' in that it both creates a certain kind of subject (i.e. a certain type of person) and subjugates (as in uses power to cast someone as a particular kind of subject). While agreeing that this struggle over the 'subject' sits alongside two other struggles (exploitation and domination) and that this 'subjugation' can be the result of these two other struggles, he argues both that 'subjugation' cannot be fully reduced down to these two other forms of domination and that this struggle over the subject has become more important in the 20th century. [331-332] From here Foucault discusses pastoral power: something originally of the church that is now taking full expression in the state. Two key points I see here is that one, pastoral power “is linked with a production of truth – the truth of the individual himself” (the creation of the subject) and two, that this form of power relies on 'exploring souls' and 'directing consciences'. [333] Before getting to what I see as the meat and potatoes of the essay Foucault concludes on 336 that the problem of the day is to liberate us “both from the state and from the type of individualization linked to the state.”
Power relations: actions on actions
The heart of Foucault's argument seems to be that power relations are about a set of actions that affect not other people but rather other people's actions and potential actions. “In effect, what defines a relationship of power is that it is a mode of action that does not act directly and immediately on others. Instead, it acts upon their actions: an action upon an action, on possible or actual future or present actions.” [340] This is why violence is distinct from power. Violence is a direct antagonism that opposes two entities. Power could be a result of violence or potential violence. For instance, if a robber held me at gun point (threatened violence) he would have constricted my set of actions (i.e. have power over me). However, they are different -- power does not need violence. Jake, for instance, has power over us by nature of being the teacher (he constrains and directs our actions) but it is not the threat of violence that gives him that power.
Power “is exercised only over free subjects... where the determining factors are exhaustive, there is no relationship of power.” [342] The absolute slave has no possibility of movement, he is merely an appendage of the ruler. Power exists because of a realm of freedom but relies on a constriction of that freedom to function. "Power is less a confrontation between two adversaries... than a question of 'government.'" [341] It is difficult to imagine someone who is either fully “free” or fully “enslaved” – freedom and power are more intricate, often bounded together. Foucault encourages the reader to think about how power, as Jake said in class, is an insidious thing. Something that is internalized just as much as it is externalized. (This is why he brings up this idea of pastoral power earlier as being the key weapon of the state and therefore the key weapon in making the Focaultdian subject.)
Foucault's “power relations” can manifest in all-sorts of ways (through economic exploitation, violence, symbols, discourse, institutions, culture, etc.). “Power relations are rooted deep in the social nexus, not a supplementary structure over and above 'society.'” [343] It is a far-stretching term. Simply by standing in a certain spot I have exercised some power over a friend (for they cannot move to where I am). This leaves me with power relations being a very useful tool to analyze society by; however, I think the difficult task is in sorting out the multitude of power relations so that we can understand which power relations are the most potent ones and understanding how they work together in a network.
I'm left with several questions: Are all social relations necessarily power-laden? If so, is this a bad thing? What constitutes bad and good power? How might Focault's understanding of power lead to a different kind of politics than Fanon/Hegel's idea of the slave rebelling against the master: are they similar, different, what would the two approaches say to one another?
~~Gabe~~p.s. Foucault once debated Noam Chomsky in a televised debate that's worth seeing.
5 comments:
When I read Foucault, I had many similar questions to Gabe. If power is more diffused and internalized, and thus arguably more insidious, the individual loses agency because it becomes more difficult to discern how we are disciplined into certain norms and become instruments of our own oppression. Thus, it appears that all social relations are, as Gabe asked, laden with power relations even if we cannot as easily see them. While Foucault's conceptualization of power does seem to attack the notion of historical progress (since all disciplinary regimes are essentially alike or only grow worse) I do not think that this fatalistic conclusion is the only one that can be drawn.
In fact, in my opinion, I think this notion of power has the potential to grant more power to the individual. While the modern forms of discipline and punishment are more hidden, it does not mean that it is impossible to unravel these internalizations of power and transform them by our own agency. The mere fact that we are able to talk about these issues in a classrooms and think about this power in our everyday lives is one example of this unraveling. (Of course, not everyone has the privilege of a college education, not to mention that education itself can be one site of this disciplinary power--but that is a whole other post :)
Still I think we can deconstruct these power relations and expose them for the social constructs that they really are. A friend of mine was thrown into the prison in Arizona for protesting against the Arizona immigration law (he himself is an "illegal immigrant") where Joe Arpaio is sherriff. This sherriff is known for forcing the prisoners to wear pink prison wear, a certain "technique of power" whereby the prisoners become instruments of their own subjugation through their humiliation. However, my friend joked about how he loved pink and thought it was a beautiful color. He was not humiliated at all ! I think that this is a good example of how the individual has the ability to not accept the disciplinary mechanisms at play in their everyday lives. We can laugh at them and refuse to become a part of it. Damien (accused of regicide), on the other hand, could not simply refuse to accept the power that was forcibly being branded upon him by laughing or turning this power on its head while somehow saving his life.
Since power in Foucault's view is not located in one person or institution but is rather constructed through social relations, even people in power are also subjects of the power relation. To me, this and Arendt's notion of the "banality of evil" allow for more space for the individual because it not merely about getting rid of the bad institutions or individual people but about transforming our relationships to each other.
Yet, perhaps this view is too idealistic. I am reminded of the Arendt's analysis of totalitarianism, of the stable instability that allows for totalitarian regimes to take hold and stay there because of this orderly chaos. Is the totalitarian regime also one of diffused, internalized power ? Moreover, there are still forms of physical violence going on today so Foucault's boundaries between the types of disciplinary regimes are not clear cut. There is still torture and genocide that cannot easily be escaped. In these cases, is it even possible to subvert the disciplinary mechanisms in the way I just suggested ? What are the limits of this ?
Below is a remarkable interview in which Foucault elucidates with great clarity his concept of power. It also shows his humanity and humor. The points you bring up – as well as the questions on relations of power – are all there.
A very important idea that is discussed in this interview is that power is not necessarily repressive. Power can be, as you've pointed out in the teacher student relationship, a very positive thing. I think what constitutes good or bad power for Foucault is determined by the extent to which we can contest that power. If we are unable to contest that power – be it a totalitarian regime, or a public university that makes it impossible for people of socio-economic status to access that university – then I think it is what Foucault describes as relations in a “state of “asymmetry”. It becomes a repressive form of power or one in which one group is disadvantaged.
We often think of power as a physical act. Foucault would argue that “power seizes to be power” when physical force takes place. The torture of Damien is not power - it is merely physical violence as a form of punishment. As Jake said in lecture, the spectacle of the punishment illustrates a form of power if the act of witnessing the violence influences the behavior of the crowd. Equally, by standing in a certain spot you have made it physically impossible for your friend to occupy that same space. But you are not exercising power – you are merely using your body to block your friend. In the interview, Foucault uses a similar example to say that if you were to make your friend angry, well then you are exercising power by shaping/influencing your friend’s behavior.
And what of prisoners? Justine’s friend did not succumb to the disciplinary powers that the prison guard attempted to exercise upon him. He is physically immobilized – he is behind bars – but he can still happily say he loves to wear pink. A prisoner may be physically forced by the guards to perform certain actions but if that prisoner still believes in the possibility of freedom, if there is a place within that prisoner that he/she has managed to preserve, to keep intact, then clearly the guard has not exercised power (think the Shawshank Redemption!).
On the other hand, Orwell’s officer shot the elephant despite not wanting to take the animal’s life, “…solely to avoid looking like a fool”. Foucault argues that power relations are fluid. The British officer and the crowd are in an unequal relation of power - the crowd is quite literally the subject - but for that one moment was there not a reversal of power?
I think the best to take from Foucault is that we must never accept what it given to us as absolute. That power is embedded everywhere. That we must look at knowledge as coming from a place of power. A psychiatrist determines a certain illness as “curable” and another as not. Violence is legitimized through a military system. The prison system determines what is “rehabilitation”. Etc. etc.
Thanks for the terrific intro.! :=)
AN INTERVIEW WITH MICHEL FOUCAULT
CONDUCTED BY MICHAEL BESS
SAN FRANCISCO (3 NOVEMBER 1980)
Question: You were saying a moment ago that you are a moralist. . . .
Foucault: In a sense, I am a moralist, insofar as I believe that one of the tasks, one of the meanings of human existence—the source of human freedom—is never to accept anything as definitive, untouchable, obvious, or immobile. No aspect of reality should be allowed to become a definitive and inhuman law for us.
We have to rise up against all forms of power—but not just power in the narrow sense of the word, referring to the power of a government or of one social group over another: these are only a few particular instances of power.
Power is anything that tends to render immobile and untouchable those things that are offered to us as real, as true, as good.
Question: But we nonetheless need to pin things down, even if in a provisional way.
Foucault: Certainly, certainly. This doesn’t mean that one must live in an indefinite discontinuity. But what I mean is that one must consider all the points of fixity, of immobilization, as elements in a tactics, in a strategy—as part of an effort to bring things back into their original mobility, their openness to change.
I was telling you earlier about the three elements in my morals. They are (1) the refusal to accept as self-evident the things that are proposed to us; (2) the need to analyze and to know, since we can accomplish nothing without reflection and understanding—thus, the principle of curiosity; and (3) the principle of innovation: to seek out in our reflection those things that have never been thought or imagined. Thus: refusal, curiosity, innovation.
Question: It seems to me that the modern philosophical concept of the subject entails all three of these principles. That is to say, the difference between the subject and the object is precisely that the subject is capable of refusal, of bringing innovation. So is your work an attack on the tendency to freeze this notion of the subject?
Foucault: What I was explaining was the field of values within which I situate my work. You asked me before if I was not a nihilist who rejected morality. I say: No! And you were asking me also, in effect, “Why do you do the work that you do?”
Here are the values that I propose. I think that the modern theory of the subject, the modern philosophy of the subject, might well be able to accord the subject a capacity for innovation, etc., but that, in actuality, modern philosophy only does so on a theoretical level. In reality, it is not capable of translating into practice this different value which I am trying to elaborate in my own work.
Question: Can power be something open and fluid, or is it intrinsically repressive?
INTERVIEW CONTINUES AT THIS SITE:
http://www.vanderbilt.edu/historydept/michaelbess/Foucault%20Interview
Wow thanks Josie ! Your response really cleared up a lot of ongoing questions I have had about Foucault. I think this interview is also really great because it addresses some potential misconceptions of what Foucault intended his theory to do. It definitely had me reconsidering a lot !
I like your question of whether all social relations are power-laden and if it is a bad thing. I think that by this model they are. Your example of exercising power on a friend by standing in one place shows this well. This being the case, I do not think that it is necessarily a bad thing. Instead it can be seen as a system of organizing social interactions.
We can look at examples of power relations in the typical Berkeley students life (neighbors and roommates restrict the amount of noise you can make; government lenders dictate the amount of money you spend which can influences everything, even what food you decide to eat) and see that they are rarely bad, unjust or harmful. They are forms of “government” in that they designate “the way in which the conduct of individuals or a group might be directed.” (Pg 341)
Certain actors may inhibit or shape my field of action but I still have freedom within it and it is my responsibility to exert that freedom as much as possible. “At the very heart of the power relationship, and constantly provoking it, are the recalcitrance of the will and the intransigence of freedom.” (pg 342)
On that note, I certainly think that some power relations are bad, harmful or unjust, as we can see from the majority of course content thus far.
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